Political business cycle theory largely abstracts from institutional context, in particular assuming that elections are competitive. Yet, as empirical work on political business cycles turns increasingly to developing countries and nascent democracies for evidence, this assumption becomes untenable. We propose and test two empirical hypotheses: first, we should only see cycles when elections involve multiparty competition; second, we should see larger cycles in founding elections. Using an indicator of multiparty competition and applying recent advances in dynamic panel (generalized method of moments) econometrics to data from Africa, we find strong support for both hypotheses. These findings have implications for democratic transitions and the compatibility of economic and political reform in nascent democracies.
Introduction
How do political structures affect the selection of economic policies? This is one of the central questions arising out of recent work on the political economy of development. In the 1990s, its significance was driven home by research and development experiences in Africa. Whether by scholars trying to unpack the "Africa dummy" in growth regressions or by the World Bank trying to understand the often disappointing experience of structural adjustment programs in Africa, the investigations revealed that African governments' policy choices mattered, and furthermore, we needed to understand the political structures that produced them. Such issues are particularly critical to the extent that politically-motivated economic policies conflict with the objectives of economic reform.
In the case of Africa, many argued that democratic political institutions would provide the political incentive structures needed to induce better policy choices. 1 Democracy -in particular, a multiparty electoral system -was seen as a tool for economic as well as political transformation and reform. Political business cycle theory provides a useful analytical context. 2 Recent empirical tests of political business cycle theory in developing countries (Brender 1999; Krueger and Turan 1993; Remmer 1993; Schuknecht 1996; Ames 1987; Block 2001 , among others), however, have applied existing theories without regard for possible differences in institutional context that differentiate developing from the developed countries for which such theories were 1 See Widner's 1994 volume, for example. intended. In particular, elections in nascent democracies -such as commonly found in Africa -may lack true multi-party competition or may be voters' first experience with competitive elections. How do multiparty elections affect economic policy choices and spending decisions? Are initial multiparty elections -when incumbent authoritarian leaders are less constrained and uncertainty surrounding electoral choice is higherdifferent from later ones? Answers to these previously ignored empirical questions may help illuminate the connections between political institutions and economic policy. Such illumination is particularly important given the emphasis of late on democratization in developing countries.
With these question in mind, we extend the empirical testing of political business cycles theory in two ways: first by explicitly testing the effect of the absence of multiparty competition on the realization of political business cycles, and second by allowing the magnitude of political business cycles to vary as a function of whether a given election is the country's first competitive election. Sub-Saharan Africa, with its rapid increase in the incidence of elections with multi-party competition (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) as well as its relative lack of institutional development, provides the ideal testing ground for our proposed extensions of the empirical testing of political business cycle theory. Indeed, our results strongly confirm not only the existence of political business cycles in Africa, but the importance of considering explicitly the introduction and effects of multi-party electoral competition in empirical analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing theory and the intuition that motivates our tests, along with a brief review of previous empirical analyses. Section 3 describes our data and empirical strategy; Section 4 summarizes our results; and, Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Motivation: Role of Electoral Institutions in Political Business Cycles
The literature on political business cycle theory is well established, yet has received at best mixed support from extensive tests against data from advanced economies. This is somewhat surprising, given the uniformity with which political business cycle theory has rested upon the assumed existence of the types of institutional structures -multi-party electoral competition in particular -common to the advanced economies. These assumptions are common to both "partisan" (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987) and "opportunistic" (Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990) theories of political business cycles.
In the rational partisan theories, the incentive to manipulate the economy derives from the partisan policy preferences of politicians running for office, and the constraint from the degree of electoral surprise. Without electoral surprise, politicians with partisan preferences would be unable to create cycles in economic activity and inflation. Rational opportunistic cycles, on the other hand, are driven by the incentives provided by electoral uncertainty, and are constrained by the competence of incumbents. For rational opportunistic models, competence serves as a constraining factor because only high competence incumbents can attempt to signal competence through pre-electoral economic manipulation. In the latter models, incentives and constraints to manipulate the economy derive from politicians' wanting to retain office (implying some prior positive probability that the incumbent could lose her reelection bid) and exploitable empirical work on political business cycles informational asymmetries. In a world with no uncertainty, the models predict no cycles.
The institutional basis of this uncertainty, then, is a key parameter in both branches of models, though opportunistic theory in particular has relied on implicit assumptions regarding the competitiveness of electoral institutions. Indeed, it has been opportunistic political business cycle theory that has guided the limited empirical testing to date that concentrates on developing countries.
In general, empirical tests in developing countries have provided stronger support for political business cycle theory. It is unsatisfactory, though, to conclude from this greater support simply that some unspecified characteristic of developing countries makes them more vulnerable to politically motivated manipulation of economic policy.
What is it in particular about developing countries that appears to make this true? Explicit efforts to model and test specific institutional factors that differentiate developing countries have only recently begun.
For example, Gonzalez (1999) adds two parameters to a Rogoff-style rational opportunistic political business cycle model: the cost of removing an incumbent from office, which she bases upon the degree of democracy; and the likelihood that publicly available information will reveal the competence of the incumbent, which she calls the "transparency of the society." Her model predicts the strongest cycles at what she labels "mid-levels of democracy." Along similar lines, Svensson and Shi (2000) propose a moral hazard model of electoral competition, which includes the magnitude of the rents of remaining in office and the share of informed voters among all voters. The size of the policy cycle is increasing in the magnitude of rents and decreasing in the share of informed voters.
We add to this work by testing explicitly the relationship between the presence of multiparty competition during elections and the existence of political business cycles.
We examine two questions in particular: First, are political business cycles more likely to accompany multiparty versus single party elections? And second, are cycles larger in founding elections (e.g., countries' first experience of competitive elections)?
Our theoretical justification for concentrating on these questions follows from an intuitive re-examination of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory (for which we take Rogoff (1990) as the archetype. As noted above, uncertainty as to the outcome of elections is critical in motivating competent incumbents to attempt to signal their competence to voters through pre-election economic distortions. Logically, however, it follows that in the absence of multi-party electoral competition there is no incentive for incumbents to engage in pre-electoral economic policy distortions as the theory predicts.
In Rogoff (1990) , for example, politicians' utility functions differ from that of other agents only by the inclusion of the "ego rents" that accompany office. However, all agents' expected utility is determined by the consumption of private and public consumption goods and by public investment, and all agents including politicians suffer the same disutility from distorted fiscal policy. The possibility of ego rents alone thus motivate competent incumbents to signal their competence by "over-spending" on public consumption goods at the expense of public investment during election years. Rogoff assumes an institutional structure in which the incumbent faces a non-zero probability of losing: in other words, a competitive electoral system (which we take as one in which multiple parties compete during the electoral process).
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If this condition does not hold, then, the model's own logic suggests that a competent incumbent will have no reason to incur the disutility associated with fiscal policy distortions. 4 In a related vein, Schultz (1995) advocates a general framework for political business cycle theory that more explicitly considers a politician's benefits and costs from electoral economic manipulation. Rather than focus on the effects of multiparty competition as we do here, he explores the impact of public opinion polls. Also, his inquiry is limited to transfer payments around British elections. Our analysis advances a similar intuition, but looks at the impact of multiparty competition on structuring incentives for opportunistic cycles. Furthermore, we move beyond the industrialized world to extend these insights to the developing world. 3 We take multiparty competition as a necessary but probably not sufficient condition for the threat of removal to feel real to incumbents. Other factors most likely matter as well: freedom of the press, the ability of the opposition to campaign without harrassment, reasonable campaign finance laws, and so on. We view testing the relationship between multiparty competition and business cycles as a first step in looking at the relationship between competition and cycles more broadly. 4 Although we use Rogoff's model to develop our argument, our analysis applies to the many variations in this branch of theory. The particular empirical implications of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory, however, do not differ dramatically from those of Nordhaus (1975) . The primary distinction is that the traditional models concentrate on economic outcomes, while the more recent versions emphasize policy and spending interventions. Both branches of opportunistic theory are consistent with the types of interventions examined below. Indeed, we do not directly measure or test "competence" as described in
Founding Elections and Political Business Cycles
Political business cycles are by their nature dynamic processes, yet empirical testing has ignored temporal effects across elections. In the developing world -Africa in particular --with its many nascent democracies, this question takes on added significance. There are various reasons why founding elections may be associated with special circumstances around political business cycles. Furthermore, in founding elections, they may face fewer institutional constraints in the form of legislatures, independent central banks, and a free press, thus making available a potentially wide range of fiscal and monetary policies as tools of manipulation. 6 Moreover, as countries introduce competitive, multi-party elections, both incumbents and voters are thrown into a new world of uncertainty. The uncertainty driving political business cycles has a temporal as well as an institutional component.
There are differences in voter's information sets between founding elections and later Rogoff . Rather, we test for the types of observable behavior that are consistent with more institutionally accurate interpretations of opportunistic political business cycle theory. 5 We apply the definition of founding elections proposed by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) , in which "…the office of head of government was openly contested following a period during which multiparty politics had been denied. " (p. 196) 6 These are noted characteristics of the politics of many African countries. As we point out below, this is one of compelling reasons to use African data for empirical tests of our hypotheses.
elections. Voters may be the least "savvy" to electoral manipulation in the first election, providing incumbents with additional incentives to induce cycles. With no prior experience to temper their assessments relating prospective performance to pre-electoral performance, voters can evaluate candidates on only the available evidence -the preelectoral surge in spending.
This story is consistent with models of rational retrospective voting, as well as the less theoretically encumbered intuition that inexperienced voters may be more easily With these hypotheses in hand, we move to a discussion of data and empirical testing.
Data and Empirical Strategy

Africa as a "natural experiment" for testing the institutional assumptions of PBC theory
As noted above, our empirical refinement of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory is likely to be most relevant in the developing world. The case of Africa is particularly interesting, not only because of the watershed increase in the incidence of elections during the early 1990s (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) , but also because Africa provides a "natural experiment" for our test of the institutional drivers of political budget cycles.
One way to capture empirically the incentive of electoral uncertainty in driving political business cycles is to vary the competitiveness of elections.
7
While many African countries have held elections, some have involved competition between parties while others have not (Ferree and Singh, 2001) . From 1980-95, African countries held 65 presidential elections, just under half of which were competitive in the sense of allowing opposition parties to contest the elections.
At the same time, many potentially confounding institutional constraints are held constant by limiting the empirical focus to Africa. In the industrialized world, the degree of discretion allowed incumbents to manipulate macro-economic policies is severely curtailed by independent central banks and legislatures. These institutional constraints lessen the likelihood of incumbent-induced electoral cycles. The story is quite different in most newly democratized African countries. The lack of independent monetary institutions and weak legislatures results in few checks on executive discretion to engage in pre-electoral economic manipulation. (Guillaume and Stasavage 1999) The discretion afforded to incumbents in many sub-Saharan African countries makes this part of the world a particularly good place to test hypotheses about the institutional bases of political business cycles. Furthermore, politics does not play out on a partisan right-left continuum in most African elections. Accordingly, a rational opportunistic framework better describes African electoral politics than does a rational partisan framework.
It is also notable that presidential terms in all the countries in our sample are for fixed periods, according to Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) . This addresses some concern for the potential bias that could enter into our estimates if elections are 7 Indeed, its effect cannot be estimated without some degree of variability (typically absent in a sample of endogenous (i.e., if leaders can call elections when the economy is doing well). Yet, Africa also stands out in this period for its relatively high incidence of founding elections.
There are 22 such elections in our data set. Founding elections are potentially endogenous in their timing, which is typically at the incumbent's discretion. Controlling for Africa's founding elections is thus both interesting in itself, and further allays concern about electoral endogeneity.
Finally, focusing our analysis on African countries reflects the crucial role that research on Africa has played in focusing policy-makers and scholars on the economic importance of the political structures through which policy decisions are made.
Data and Methodology
The data used to test our hypothesis includes annual observations (1980-95) for 44 Sub-Saharan African countries (listed in In terms of our independent variables, the first political variable is the date of presidential elections, which are summarized in Table 2.   8 These election dates are drawn advanced democracies)from Bratton and van de Walle (1996) and from Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut (1999) .
The data set includes 65 presidential elections. Of the 44 countries in the sample, only 8 held no presidential elections, 17 held only one, and the remaining 19 held multiple elections during the period. In addition to the listed presidential elections, there were 107 legislative elections in the sample. We limit the analysis to presidential elections as they pose a more direct threat to power and are more relevant in a political context characterized by Bratton and van de Walle (1997, p. 63) as featuring "the systematic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks."
The second political variable is an indicator of electoral contestability, introduced by Ferree and Singh (2001) . This scale (which we label ECMP) measures the level of competition that occurs during the executive selection process. Unlike other commonly used measures (i.e., Gastil's political and civil liberties indices) that aggregate many considerations into a overall score, the executive scale captures a single, highly central component of electoral competitiveness -the presence or absence of competition within or between parties. While other factors also affect competition (for example, freedom of the press), they are more difficult to measure. Thus, the scale opts for specificity and clarity over trying to capture and test all aspects of competition that might matter. Ferree and Singh identify six levels as follows:
• Level 1 --No executive exists • Level 2 --Executive exists but was not elected • Level 3 --Executive is elected, but was the sole candidate • Level 4 --Executive is elected, and multiple candidates competed for the office • Level 5 --Multiple parties were also able to contest the executive elections (Alesina, Roubini, Cohen (1997) is to score the election dummy variable to equal one in the prior year when the election occurs prior to 1 June. This adjustment did not alter our results or conclusions.
• Level 6 --Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections For the purposes of this analysis, the relevant distinction is between Level 6 (multiparty elections) and Levels 3 and 4 of the scale (single party elections). There are 33 multiparty elections in our data set and 32 single party. Table 2 provides a mapping between election dates and the executive scale levels. The combination of election dates and the scale of electoral competitiveness (ECMP) permits us to explore the impact of multiparty competition in shaping the incentives for opportunistic politicians to engage in pre-electoral macroeconomic intervention. If multiparty electoral systems produce business cycles but single party systems do not, we will have uncovered an important channel through which political institutions affects economic policy-making and therefore, performance.
The econometric specification with which we test for political business cycles thus takes the form where Table 2 ), and α i is an unobserved country-specific timeinvariant effect.
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The dependent variable in each specification is one of the four macroeconomic aggregates listed above. The appropriate number of lags (k) on the dependent variable was determined in each case by the Schwarz Information Criterion.
The specification in equation (1) (within) estimator that includes α i avoids heterogeneity bias, but is still inconsistent (with finite T) due to a correlation of the order (1/T) between the explanatory variables and the residuals in the transformed model (Hsiao, 1986 ). Arellano and Bond (1991) resolve these problems with a dynamic panel generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator, the details of which are presented in Appendix 1. Arellano and Bond's estimation strategy, in short, is to first-difference the equations to eliminate α i , and to fix the resulting inconsistency by applying instrumental variables consisting of appropriately lagged levels of the variables. Based on derived moment conditions, the set of valid instruments grows incrementally as the year approaches T. Arellano and Bond's (1991) GMM estimator builds on this foundation and fixes the remaining problem of autocorrelated errors in the resulting model. Subsequent work in this vein has added to the list of moment conditions, leading to a System-GMM model (Blundell and Bond, 1998) , which is also applied here as appropriate.
Results
The results presented in this section provide strong support for both of our hypotheses: multiparty elections are associated with political business cycles while single party ones are not; furthermore, cycles are larger in founding elections compared to subsequent ones. In keeping with the emphasis of the rational opportunistic branch of theory, we concentrate our empirical tests on policy interventions rather than real outcomes. Indeed, we find no significant results when testing for election-year effects on growth in GDP. In particular, we test for electorally timed interventions in two fiscal policy and three monetary policy variables: public expenditure, net claims on the central government, money growth, seignorage, and nominal exchange rate devaluation.
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Our specific hypotheses are as follows:
• For the first three dependent variables -public expenditure, net claims on the central government, and money growth -we expect a significant increase in election years relative to non-election years in countries with multiparty electoral systems and little if any effect in other countries.
• In the case of seignorage, rational opportunistic political business cycle theory predicts an increase in the post-election year (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997) . Our hypothesis in that case is that there is a significant increase in seignorage during post-election years relative to election years in countries with competitively elected executives, and little if any effect in other countries.
• We extend this post-election year hypothesis to exchange rate devaluation, as well, though the relevant theoretical literature has ignored this variable.
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• We further hypothesize that transitions to democracy create added incentives for pre-electoral economic manipulation. Hence, we expect the occurrence of founding elections to magnify the observed political business cycles.
These hypotheses are uniformly sustained in the results presented in Table 3 .
Column (1) presents results for public expenditure. There is clearly no election year effect in systems where the executive selection process is single party (ECMP i,t < 6).
The interaction term indicates that the marginal impact of electoral competition increases public expenditures during election years by 2.7 percentage points of GDP. The total election-year increase in public expenditures in multiparty elections (the sum of the estimates for single party elections and the interaction term for elections and multiparty competition) is thus 2.4 percentage points of GDP. Column 1 further shows that the 12 Among the few empirical papers to relate elections with devaluations are Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein (2000) , and Klein and Marion (1997) over the effect of multi-party competition). These marginal and total effects are all statistically significant at greater than the .01-level. Table 3 column (2) with founding elections; yet, this effect is imprecisely measured (P-value = .15).
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Both fiscal policy interventions thus sustain our hypothesis that the incentives for pre-electoral intervention are contingent upon the presence of multiparty competition.
The added opportunities that accompany democratic transition are also substantial. percentage points in the rate of monetary expansion. The increase attributed to founding elections could reflect the greater control that authoritarian leaders exercise over money supply, lending support to our first explanation for the significance of founding elections (i.e., authoritarian regimes have more discretion to manipulate policy). In reference to our second conjecture on voter information, voters cannot observe the growth in money supply prior to the election and therefore, cannot include it in their decision calculus. Table 3 column (4) presents our results for seignorage. This variable complements net claims on government as an explanation for how politicians finance their election-year sprees of public spending. In the case of seignorage, theory suggests that increases will occur in the post-election year. Here, too, our findings strongly confirm theory. However, even single party elections give rise to post-election increases in seignorage, which is somewhat puzzling given our logic. The evidence in column 4
indicates that single party elections are followed by increases in seignorage equivalent to 1.8 percentage points of GDP. This result is statistically significant at the .01 level. The marginal impact of multiparty competition in this case is negative (though only marginally significantly so). The total increase in seignorage, however, remains positive for multiparty elections, increasing by over 1.2 percentage points of GDP. Once again, the opportunities and incentives created by democratic transition prove substantial: the total effect of founding elections is double that of competitive non-founding elections, with a point estimate of 2.46 percentage points of GDP. This result, too, is statistically significant at the .01 level.
Exchange rate devaluations are politically unpopular. Indeed, Table 3 column (5) presents clear evidence that incumbents wait until after elections to devalue nominal exchange rates. This dependent variable, though uncommon in the political business cycle literature, may be particularly relevant in Africa where incumbents often directly set exchange rates. In keeping with our maintained hypothesis, this result does not apply in single party electoral systems. Yet, we find that average nominal exchange rate devaluation in post-election years in multiparty systems increases by over 32 percentage points relative to other years. For founding elections, the point estimate is a devaluation of over 40 percentage points, though the latter is not statistically significantly different from multiparty elections in general.
In sum, our results sustain our hypothesis that incumbents' incentive to create political business cycles in nascent democracies is strong, but contingent on multiparty competition. Seignorage is the only variable tested for which we find evidence of political intervention in single party as well as multiparty systems. In contrast, multiparty systems differentially give rise to election-year interventions in public expenditures, net claims on government, and nominal devaluations. Further, the occurrence of founding elections magnifies the effect of multiparty competition in general in the cases of public expenditure, money growth, and seignorage (and fall just short of statistical significance in the case of net claims). That real money growth is evident only in the cases of founding elections, where incentives and opportunities for intervention are magnified may reflect greater direct executive control of money supply in countries prior to the institution of multiparty elections.
Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we present a more institutionally rich test of rational opportunistic political business cycles by considering the incentives and constraints imposed on politicians by different electoral institutions. Specifically, we reason that in settings where elections do not entail multiparty competition, an incumbent's utility function does not produce incentives to engage in electoral economic manipulation. Furthermore, we hypothesize that initial or founding multiparty elections would present both the greatest incentives and the fewest constraints for electoral economic manipulation.
Applying recent dynamic panel econometric techniques to data from African countries, we find strong support for both hypotheses: 1) the existence of political business cycles is contingent on having multiparty elections, and 2) founding multiparty elections exhibit larger cycles than subsequent ones. Our findings demonstrate the existence of election-year increases in public expenditure, net claims on government, and post-election year surges in seignorage in multiparty electoral systems, and post-election nominal devaluations. Only in the case of seignorage is there any evidence of such effect in countries with single party elections. Moreover, our evidence strongly supports the conclusion that founding elections magnify incumbents' incentives to create political business cycles. Thus, it appears that competition between political parties (inter-party competition) is a crucial institutional driver of rational opportunistic models of political business cycles.
Increasing competition by allowing for multi-party elections is often the first step in democratization reforms. However, our findings suggest that political reform as proxied by the introduction of multiparty competition may work at cross purposes with on-going efforts at economic reform -twin challenges in many developing regions, Africa in particular. This may offer some insights into the fragility of young democracies (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000) , and highlight the importance of institutional checks on executive discretion in sustaining political and economic reforms.
By inducing macroeconomic cycles, multiparty competition seems to make a difference in politician's responsiveness to citizens, though perhaps not in a Paretoimproving way. Does this suggest that we need to reframe some of the debates around democracy and representation -whether elections actually induce accountability? (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999) Empirical verification of democratic accountability has too often looked for evidence of Pareto-improving outcomes in economic policy-making: studies look for relationships between survival rates of governments or vote shares and economic performance, for example. (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; Lewis-Beck 1988; Paldam 1981; Strom and Lipset 1984; Lewis-Beck and Mitchell 1990; Powell and Whitten 1993) Perhaps scholars are looking for the wrong type of evidence? Can we instead learn something about how elections foster accountability from studying political business cycles in more institutionally rich models?
Our results suggest that multiparty elections do, indeed, induce responsiveness and accountability of sorts, though not necessarily in the form of better economic policies. There may be a significant learning curve for both politicians and voters in learning to send and interpret accurate electoral signals. Certainly, the magnitude of political business cycles changes over time in democratic systems from the first election to subsequent ones. To adequately address this question will require us to elaborate the institutional foundations of our theoretical models. Current political business cycle theory typically models single election cycles in isolation from one another. Yet, in so far as enduring political institutions tie together these elections, they may need to be modeled as related events. Further attention must also focus on the process through which voters form expectations, and how political institutions figure into this process of molding expectations.
Appendix 1
This appendix provides supporting technical details for the GMM estimators used in the paper. The generic case of a dynamic panel model takes the form (A.1)
Where α i represents unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects, x it is an exogenous variables, and , u it is assumed to be i.i.d. Arellano and Bond (1991) note, 
